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A ﬁnite set of agents jointly undertake a project. Depending on the aggregate of individual agent
characteristics the project runs losses or proﬁts, which have to be shared. This paper adopts the mecha-
nistic view and concentrates on devices that a contingent planner may use in order to share the net proﬁts.
The Moulin and Shenker (1994) representation theorem is used to show that additive mechanisms with
the constant returns property relate 1 to 1 to rationing methods. Reﬁnements are discussed dealing with
monotonicity and equity properties that relate to the dispersion of shares. The second part introduces
the notion of a consistent solution. Each rationing method induced by a consistent mechanism is consis-
tent. If such mechanism is continuous as well, then the corresponding rationing method is parametric.
Most prevalent mechanisms (average, serial, Shapley-Shubik) are consistent as member of the class of
incremental mechanisms. Each interval consistent incremental mechanism is shown to be a composi-
tion of marginal mechanisms and the average mechanism. Immediately the average mechanism is the
unique strongly consistent solution. Finally a characterization of mechanisms within the general class is
discussed using super-additivity.
Keywords: cooperative production, cost sharing, mechanism design, investment, (parametric) rationing,
core, additivity, monotonicity
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1 Sharing variable returns
The simplest model of distributive justice is that of the rationing model as discussed in Moulin (2000).
As Moulin (2002) shows, this model is closely related to the more involved cost sharing model where
the amount to be shared is the costs for production of the aggregate of the individual demands. Israelsen
(1980) discusses a dual model where workers share the returns from a jointly owned production facility,
given the individual efforts or inputs. Both type of models have in common that for a given set of agents
N = {1,2,...,n} and a list of individual characteristics q ∈ RN
+ there is an amount f(∑i qi) to be shared.
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1The distinction between the models is the way that the size of a share of f(∑i qi) is perceived: higher cost
shares are depreciated, whereas higher production shares are appreciated. This paper abstracts from the
above interpretations and considers the more general (variable) proﬁt sharing problem where each agent
i is endowed with some input characteristic qi which in turn affects the total proﬁts of the project via
aggregation of the characteristics. This means that the proﬁts of the project are described by a function f
that relates size of aggregate input characteristics to the degree of proﬁtability of the project.
Apart from the standard cost sharing and production models, there are numerous other situations that ﬁt
into this model.
Investment The scale of many enterprizes may demand for several investors. Then its successfulness will –
amongst others – depend on the level of total investments. Typically, the dependency of investments and net
proﬁts possibly go in two directions: under-investment may well result in bankruptcy or shrinking business
whereas over-investment may lower average returns per invested unit.
Common pool problems Agents invest in harvesting. The total of investments affects both a production as
well as a cost component.
Consumer organizations Consumers pool demands in order to get better prices. The cost savings are
related to the size of the aggregate demands. Or consider the pooling of savings in order to get better rates
at bank.
The central question in all these problems is what the dispersion of the individual shares of the proﬁts
should be. In many applications proﬁts are shared proportional to the agent characteristics. As for instance
on stock-markets where an agents’ characteristic is the number of shares owned and dividends are paid per
share. Though the idea of proportionality is probably the oldest and the most widely spread, the literature
on distributive justice discusses and promotes other solutions as well.
The success and the desirability of a particular solution depends on the actual context of the problem.
The search for the ideal solution to an instance of a proﬁt sharing problem can in general not be answered
and should be regarded as ambiguous. Nevertheless it may put forward principles of proﬁt sharing in a more
general context within the sphere of a variety of problems. This paper follows the approach of the axiomatic
literature in that it discusses several structural properties and looks to characterize solutions satisfying them
(see e.g. Thomson (1999)). Some properties prescribe a solution in special cases of ”obvious” problems,
whereas others express an invariance of the solution to certain changes in the parameters of the problem. In
this respect the most prominent properties will be consistency, that pertains to variations of the set of agents
among whom the distribution of proﬁts must take place, and additivity which allows a benevolent planner
to combine results for several instances of problems to solve the problem by a single instance.
2 Overview of the results and relation to the literature
The paper shows ways to generalize the standard production sharing model where it is the outputs that have
to be shared by agents having equal access rights for the production technology relative to their individual
investments such as labor. The technology is fully described by a production function that assigns to each
level of input the maximal output that can thus be generated. Then given a proﬁle of individual investments
the corresponding produced output has be allocated. This paper generalizes this model by interpreting the
production function as a proﬁt function. These proﬁt functions may be decreasing, increasing, attain pos-
itive as well as negative values. The negative values are interpreted as costs. The class of problems with
non-decreasing proﬁt functions are the production problems as in Israelsen (1982) and Moulin and Shenker
2(1992). Problems with non-increasing proﬁt functions are the cost sharing problems as in Moulin (2002).
The same setup is chosen to address the problem of natural monopoly in Sharkey (1982) and Baumol et al.
(1982). This paper considers solutions concepts to the cooperative proﬁt sharing problems, i.e. devices that
assign to each instance of a cooperative proﬁt sharing problem a set of allocations.
Section 3 provides the basic setup for proﬁts sharing problems, as well as the notion of a solution.
Numerous examples of solutions and mechanisms are provided. Special solutions are the mechanisms that
correspond to singletons. The solutions in this paper are all direct generalizations from the cost sharing
literature. Relevant examples in the mechanistic cost sharing literature include solutions like the average
cost sharing mechanism, the Shapley-Shubik mechanism (Shubik (1962), Sudh¨ olter (1998), Young (1985)),
the serial mechanism (Moulin and Shenker (1992,1994)). Multi-valued solutions are deﬁned as the cores
or imputation sets of relevant cooperative transferable utility games, one of which is the stand-alone proﬁt
game that is inspired by the stand-alone cost game as in Young (1985, 1994).
Section 4 focusses on the relation between a speciﬁc class of mechanisms and the class of rationing
methods. More speciﬁcally, it is shown that positive and additive proﬁt sharing mechanisms that satisfy
constant returns are characterized by monotonic and continuous rationing methods. This is an extension
of the characterization result of Moulin and Shenker (1994). It is shown that though the above class may
be considered rather small, the (huge) pessimistic core consists exactly of the solutions generated by it.
Properties are discussed as to describe how the individual shares of proﬁts are related. Like equal treatment
of equals and proﬁt- and loss monotonicity, which are variants of the ranking property in the cost sharing
literature. Then using these properties a reﬁnement of the generalized Moulin and Shenker (1994) theorem
are derived. In addition, the average mechanism is the unique mechanism that satisﬁes a weak solidarity
property – that of nullity – as well.
Section 5 introduces concepts of consistency for proﬁt sharing solutions that describes invariance of
solutions in a model with varying sets of agents. The proposed concepts are alternatives to those found in
the cost sharing literature (see, e.g., Young (1985), Moulin and Shenker (1994) and Sudh¨ olter (1998)). Each
consistent mechanism in the class of mechanisms that is characterised in the previous section is represented
by a family of consistent rationing methods as in Young (1987) and Moulin (2000,2002). In addition, the
counterpart of Theorem 1 of Young (1987) is that each family of rationing methods that deﬁnes a continu-
ous, consistent and symmetric mechanism is parametric.
The class of incremental mechanisms is introduced that can be seen to generalize the notion of random order
value of Weber (1988). It is the class that corresponds to piecewise linear rationing methods. Each mecha-
nism that is represented by a family of consistent and piecewise linear rationing methods is consistent. As a
result most of the prevalent additive mechanisms in the literature are consistent. Nevertheless, there are just
a few that satisfy the stronger property of interval consistency, i.e., the mechanisms that combine the mar-
ginal mechanisms and the average mechanism. In other words, using the terminology of Moulin (2000) for
rationing methods, the irreducible interval consistent incremental mechanisms are the average mechanism
and the marginal mechanisms. This leads us to conclude that, basically, the average sharing mechanism is
the unique mechanism that is both incremental and strongly consistent. For each proﬁts sharing problem
the solutions of the consistent incremental mechanisms are dense in the set of solutions generated by the
class of additive mechanisms with the properties positivity and constant returns. The results for set-valued
solutions are that the maximal consistent solution satisfying the bounds put forward by the pessimistic in-
dividual bounds is the pessimistic core.
Section 6 studies general (set) solutions and characterizes the mechanisms using a weakened form of
additivity together with properties like non-emptiness and bounds.
33 The proﬁt sharing problem and preliminaries
Throughout this paper we will restrict ourselves to a ﬁxed and ﬁnite group of agents N = {1,2,...,n}.
The group of agents is involved in a joint project. The successfulness of the project hinges upon a proﬁle
of agent characteristics. One may think of a proﬁle of individual demands, as in cost sharing, or a proﬁle of
individual investments such as labor input or money. Each such a proﬁle of agent characteristics, or inputs,
is summarized by a vector q ∈ RN
+. It is assumed that the relation between the inputs and net proﬁts or net
returns of the project are summarized by a proﬁt function f : R+ → R; f (∑i∈N qi) indicates the returns
of the project in case of proﬁle of inputs q ∈ RN. A special situation occurs when the aggregate level of the
agent characteristics is zero. It will be assumed that then f(0) = 0; nothing happens when the aggregate of
agent characteristics is zero. In the cost sharing context this condition is mostly understood as the absence
of ﬁxed costs. In addition, it is assumed that a proﬁt function is an absolutely continuous function of the
aggregate input variable1. In particular this means that such a function is differentiable almost everywhere
where. Then for any proﬁt function f we will take f0 : R+ → R to denote the function that equals the
derivative of f, if it exists, and that takes the value 0 otherwise. This function will be referred to as the
marginal proﬁt function f0. By absolute continuity each marginal proﬁt function f0 is Lebesgue integrable
and we may express total proﬁts for at input level y in terms of the marginal proﬁt function f0, since for all





The set of all proﬁt functions is denoted by F. Special functions are the zero function and the identity
deﬁned by fz(y) = 0 and fid(y) = y for all y ∈ R+ respectively. We distinguish two special classes in F,
F− and F+, the classes of all non-increasing and non-decreasing elements in F, respectively. An element
in F− is also referred to as cost function, when negative proﬁts are interpreted as costs. The classes F− and
F+ are dual in the sense that f ∈ F− ⇔ −f ∈ F+. Each element f ∈ F can be written as the difference









Then f = f+ − f−.
A proﬁts sharing problem for the agents in S ⊆ N is an ordered pair (q, f) consisting of a proﬁt function
f ∈ F and a vector of inputs q ∈ RS
+, that summarizes the individual characteristics of the individual
agents; qi is the characteristic of agent i ∈ S. The set of all proﬁt sharing problems for S is denoted RS;
moreover put R :=
S
S⊆N RS. The subset of RS of all proﬁt sharing problems with c ∈ F+ is denoted
RS
+, and R+ :=
S
S⊆N RS
+. Similarly we deﬁne RS
− and R− as the class of all proﬁt sharing problems
with proﬁt function in F−; this is the class of all cost sharing problems.
1A function f : R+ → R is absolutely continuous if for all intervals [a,b] ⊂ R+ and ε > 0 there is a δ > 0 such that
for every ﬁnite collection of pairwise disjoint intervals (ak,bk) ⊂ [a,b],k = 1,2,...,n with ∑
n
k=1 (bk − ak) < δ, we have
∑
n
k=1 |f (bk) − f (ak)| < ε.
2This follows by the Fundamental Theorem in Lebesgue (1904).
4For any vector y ∈ RS and S ⊆ N deﬁne y(S) = ∑i∈S yi; denote the unit simplex {y ∈ RS
+
  y(S) = 1}
by ∆(S). For A ⊆ R the indicator function I A : R → {0,1} is deﬁned by
I A(t) =

1 if t ∈ A,
0 else.
To each proﬁt sharing problem R = (q, f) ∈ R we associate the pessimistic proﬁt sharing problem
(q, f P
R) where f P












 T ∈ B([0,q(S)]);λ(T) = y

if y ∈ [0,q(S)],
f (y) if y > q(S).
(3)
Here B ([0,q(S)]) stands for the Borel-σ-algebra on the interval [0,q(S)] and λ is the Lebesgue measure.
So the pessimistic proﬁts function f P
R relates each level of aggregate inputs y ∈ [0,d(S)] to a speciﬁc
lower bound on proﬁts that is the minimum of corresponding aggregate marginal proﬁts on [0,q(S)]. In
cost sharing terms this is what Tijs and Koster (1998) deﬁned by the pessimistic cost function. 3 It is easy
to show that each such pessimistic proﬁts function f P
R is convex on the interval [0,q(S)].
Given a proﬁt sharing problem (q, f) ∈ RS, the focus is on ways to assign the total proﬁts f (q(S)) for the
collective of agents S ⊆ N. For (q, f) ∈ RS an element y ∈ RS with the property that y(S) = f (q(S))
is called a vector of proﬁt shares or just share vector. A solution is a mapping Ψ that assigns for each
S ⊆ N to each (q, f) ∈ RS a subset Ψ(q, f) ⊆ RS of share vectors. In addition a solution Ψ is called
mechanism if it is single-valued, i.e. the set Ψ(q, f) consists of precisely one element for all proﬁt sharing
problems (q, f) ∈ RS,S ⊆ N. The class of all solutions and mechanisms, resp., is denoted S and M.
By S+ we denote the class of solutions on R+, i.e., all mappings Ψ that assigns for each S ⊆ N and
(q, f) in RS
+ a subset Ψ(q, f) ⊆ RS of share vectors. Then M+ := M ∩ S+. With slight abuse of
notation we will write Ψ(q, f) = x whenever x is the unique element in Ψ(q, f). The class of solutions and
mechanisms, resp., with properties P1,P2,...,Pk is denoted S(P1,P2,...,Pk) and M(P1,P2,...,Pk). A
solution Ψ ∈ S satisﬁes positivity (POS) if for all f ∈ F+ and x ∈ Ψ(q, f) it holds that x ≥ 0. A solution
is nonempty (NE) if Ψ(q, f) 6= ∅ for all proﬁt sharing problems (q, f). In particular M ⊆ S(NE) and
M+ ⊆ S+(NE). Now we will discuss the solutions that will be most prominent in this paper. The focus
will be on a ﬁxed problem R = (q, f) ∈ RS.
Examples of multi-valued solutions
The multi-valued solutions in this paper all stem from ideas in cooperative game theory applied to the co-
operative stand alone game (see, e.g., Young (1985, 1994)) and pessimistic game (Tijs and Koster (1998)).
• The most trivial (multi-valued) solution that comes to mind is the set of all share vectors, i.e. the set
A(q, f) =
n
x ∈ RS 
 x(S) = f (q(S))
o
.
• The imputation set is deﬁned by
I(q, f) =
n
x ∈ RS   x(S) = f(q(S)),∀i ∈ S,xi ≥ f(qi)
o
.
3A generalization of the pessimistic cost sharing problem to heterogeneous cost sharing problems is in Koster (2000).
5Related is the pessimistic imputation set, i.e., the set deﬁned by
I
P(q, f) = I(q, f
P
R). (4)
• The stand alone core (Young (1994)) is the set of all share vectors
C(q, f) =
n
x ∈ RS 
 x(S) = f(q(S)),∀Q ⊂ S,x(Q) ≥ f(q(Q))
o
.
The related pessimistic core is deﬁned by
C




The mechanisms below are direct generalizations of mechanisms that are better known from the cost sharing
literature. For a reference see Moulin (2002).
• The average cost sharing mechanism µAV determines the share vector
µ








As a mechanism on R− it is better known as the average cost sharing mechanism (see e.g. Moulin
(2002)).
• Let Π(S) be the set of all mappings S → {1,2,...,|S|}. For each σ ∈ Π(S) we deﬁne for
q ∈ RS




j = ∑`≤j qσ(j). Then for any σ ∈ Π(S), the corresponding
marginal mechanism µσ ∈ RS is deﬁned by
µσ











So for each sharing problem µσ (q, f) is the marginal vector with respect to the stand alone game
(see Young (1985)). The Shapley-Shubik mechanism Φ averages all marginal or incremental share
vectors, i.e., Φ(q, f) = 1
n! ∑σ∈Π(N) µσ (q, f).4 Deﬁne the pessimistic marginal mechanism with
respect to σ ∈ Π(N) by
µσ
p (q, f) := µσ (q, f
P
R), for all R = (q, f) ∈ RS. (7)
The pessimistic Shapley-Shubik mechanism ΦP is deﬁned by ΦP (q, f) = Φ(q, f P
R). Weber (1988)
discusses the class of random order values consisting of all mechanisms that are a convex combina-
tion of marginal mechanisms.
• For q ∈ RS





0 = 0 and q∗
j = ∑`≤j−1 qσ(`) + (|S| − j + 1)qσ(j). Then the serial mechanism µSR (see, e.g.,
Moulin and Shenker (1992)) is deﬁned by
µ
SR





|S| − ` + 1
for all f ∈ F,i ∈ S. (8)
4It is the Shapley value for the stand alone transferable utility game.
64 Additive mechanisms and rationing methods
Additivity is propagated in the cost sharing literature as an accounting convention stating that decomposing
a cost sharing problem in several cost components should not alter the ﬁnal solution to the problem. Instead
of focussing on several separate cost sharing problems, it is the property of additivity that allows for a single
operation of calculation of cost shares. The same interpretation can be adopted for general proﬁt sharing
problems in those cases where it makes sense to calculate the shares in two problems with the same proﬁle
of agent characteristics.
Additivity A mechanism µ satisﬁes ADD if
µ(q, f1 + f2) = µ(q, f1) + µ(q, f2)
for all input proﬁles q and f1, f2 ∈ F.
Suppose the proﬁt function f is the additive compound of the functions f1 ∈ F+ and f2 ∈ F−. Then
f can be interpreted as the net revenues in the enterprize with proﬁt function f1 and cost function f2. In
turn, additivity requires that costs and proﬁts are treated symmetrically.
Examples of additive mechanisms are numerous, amongst them we ﬁnd µAV,µσ,µSR and Φ. In this re-
spect I like to point at the excellent overview on additive cost sharing in Moulin (2002). In particular in this
work the power of the additivity as a mathematical tool becomes apparent.5
If marginal proﬁts is constant relative to the agent characteristic, then it is reasonable if not compelling to
credit the individual agents the same ﬁxed marginal returns per unit of the characteristic. Then in case the
agent characteristic is demand as in cost sharing models, or labor as in production models, then this would
prescribe the same price and return per unit for each of the agents. So, in linear cases where where no
externalities are present this amounts to the following property:
Constant Returns Ψ satisﬁes CR if Ψ(q, fϑ) = ϑq for all ϑ > 0.
All previously discussed solutions satisfy CR, except for A. In particular, the variety of mechanisms
in the class M(CR) is large, even if we would superimpose the additivity property. Nevertheless, within
the class M+ the set of all positive mechanisms with the properties ADD and CR is rather small in view
of the Moulin and Shenker (1994) representation theorem. They show the 1-1 correspondence between
rationing methods and additive cost sharing methods with CR property. Accordingly, each such cost sharing
mechanism distributes marginal costs at each relevant level in a ﬁxed ratio among the agents, and the share
at each level is determined irrespective of the corresponding marginal costs. We will translate their result to
ﬁt the present model.
Arationingproblemforcoalition S ⊂ N consistsofapair(q,t) ∈ RS
+ ×R+ suchthat q(S) ≥ t. These
are the most elementary problems in distributive justice and many types of problems can be modelled as
5Nevertheless, slowly a new branch develops in which non-additive methods are proposed and analyzed. See, e.g., Sprumont
(1998), Tijs and Koster (1998), Koster (2001), Hougaard and Petersen (2001). The pessimistic methods above are examples of
methods that are non-additive, and others are easily constructed by a composition µ ◦ ϕ of an additive mechanism µ together with
the non-additive transformation of the sharing problem ϕ : R = (q, f) 7→ (q, f
P
R).Koster (2002) deﬁnes the pessimistic serial cost
sharing mechanism that is a composite mapping with the serial cost sharing mechanism
7such; just to mention the literature on taxation problems (Young (1985)) and bankruptcy problems (Aumann
and Maschler (1985)).
A rationing method r for S associates to any rationing problem (q,t) a vector r(q,t) ∈ [0,q] such that
∑i∈S ri(q,t) = t. A rationing method is monotonic whenever t ≤ t0 implies r(q,t) ≤ r(q,t0) for all
t,t0,q ∈ RS
+. Then each such rationing method deﬁnes for all q ∈ RS
+ a monotonic (and continuous) path
t 7→ r(q,t) from 0 to q. A rationing method is called piecewise linear if the path t 7→ r(q,t) is piecewise
linear. Moulin and Shenker (1994) show the close relationship between rationing and cost sharing which
can be translated in the terminology of this paper:
Theorem 4.1 Moulin and Shenker (1994)
Let µ ∈ M+(POS,ADD,CR). Then there is for each S ⊆ N,q ∈ RS





f0(t)dr(q,t) for all f ∈ F+. (9)
Theorem 4.1 states that a mechanism in M+(POS,ADD,CR) is fully characterized through its rationing







, one for each input proﬁle q.
The mechanism corresponding to such family π will be denoted µπ.
Remark In the above characterizations we can not leave out POS. Consider the mechanism µ that equals
µAV except for all proﬁts sharing problems for the agents in N = {1,2}. In these cases put

µ1(q, f) = 1
2 f(2q1), and
µ2(q, f) = f(q1 + q2) − 1
2 f(2q1).
Then µ is additive, satisﬁes CR, but not POS. Moreover, µ is not representable by a family of rationing
methods, since µ assumes information about proﬁts outside the interval [0,q(N)], as opposed to all mech-
anisms representable as (9).
The above characterization result is easily extended to proﬁts sharing mechanisms on R.
Proposition 4.2 Each µ ∈ M+(ADD) uniquely extends to ¯ µ ∈ M(ADD).





Below we will focus on some reﬁnements of Theorem 4.3. First of all, note that in our model, except
for the labeling of the agents it is only their individual input that may inﬂuence a solution. Then, if two
agents can not be distinguished for these characteristics then it is reasonable to demand that they should be
treated equally by the solution.
Equal Treatment Ψ ∈ S satisﬁes ET if for all x ∈ Ψ(q, f) it holds that xi = xj whenever qi = qj.
ET is weaker than the anonymity property in Moulin and Shenker (1992). Together with the properties
8POS,ADD,CR, equal treatment implies that the rationing methods for agents with equal inputs are the
same.
Proposition 4.4 µ ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR,ET) if and only if
(i) µ is generated by a rationing family π, i.e., µ = µπ,
(ii)for all q ∈ RS
+ with qi = qj for some i, j ∈ S,r(q,·) ∈ π, it holds ri(q,·) = rj(q,·)
Proof. POS,ADD,CR implies the functional representation as in Theorem 4.3. Now suppose that there is
q ∈ RS
+ and i, j ∈ S with qi = qj but that ri(q,·) = rj(q,·) does not hold. Then by continuity there is an




IU (t)dt for all y ∈ R+.
Then






IU (t)drj(q,t) = µj (q, f),
contradiction.
Proﬁt Monotonicity Ψ ∈ S satisﬁes PM if for all R = (q, f) ∈ R+ it holds for all x ∈ Ψ(q, f) that
xi ≥ xj if qi ≥ qj.
Proﬁt monotonicity assures that, apart from the interpretation of the agent characteristics, the larger the
characteristic is the larger the gains. The next property formulates the dual, that when there are only losses
from the project, the ones with the larger inputs suffer more.
Loss Monotonicity Ψ ∈ S satisﬁes LM if for all R = (q, f) ∈ R− it holds for all x ∈ Ψ(q, f) that
xi ≥ xj if qi ≤ qj.
Both PM and LM can be considered weak: for all occurrences of mixed externality the axioms are even
vacuous. And, moreover, still they do not affect ﬂexibility in treating pure losses differently from proﬁts in
the sense that for µ ∈ M(PM,LM) and the dual problems (d, f) ∈ R+,(q,−f) ∈ R− it need not hold
that µ(q, f) = −µ(q,−f). Nevertheless, together with ADD this degree of freedom is lost. The following
shows that the dispersion of the shares in case of losses is the same for proﬁts.
Proposition 4.5 Let Y ∈ {PM,LM}. Then µ ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR,Y) if and only if
(i) µ is generated by a rationing family π, i.e., µ = µπ,
(ii) for all q ∈ RS
+,i, j ∈ S,r(q,·) ∈ π,qi ≥ qj ⇒ ri(q,·) ≥ rj(q,·)
The proofs are similar to that of Proposition 4.4 and we omitted them for this reason. Notice that Propo-
sition 4.5 implies that any mechanism µ ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR,Y) for Y ∈ {PM,LM} satisﬁes ET.
9The representation of mechanisms by rationing families sees to shares of the same sign in case f ∈ F+
or f ∈ F−. A somewhat different property, but still related, is the following:
Null Ψ ∈ S satisﬁes NULL if for all (q, f) ∈ RS with f(q(S)) = 0 it holds Ψ(q, f) = {0}.
Notice that NULL suggests to comprise all information in the proﬁts function into a single point of
evaluation as in case of µAV. Then on top of the characterizing properties in Theorem 4.3, by discarding
all intermediate information about marginal revenues, it is strong enough to pin down the set of eligible
candidates to a singleton.
Theorem 4.6 M(POS,ADD,CR,NULL) = {µAV}.
Proof. Take µ ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR,NULL). Then according to Theorem 4.3 there is a rationing family
π = {r(q,·)

 q ∈ RS
+,S ⊆ N} such that µ = µπ. Now suppose that there is S ⊆ N,q ∈ RS
+ \ {0}
such that not r(q,t) = tq/q(S) for all t. By continuity of t 7→ ri(q,t) there are i ∈ S and intervals U,V in
[0,q(S)] such that 
ri(q,t) < tqi/q(S) for all t ∈ U, and
ri(q,t) > tqi/q(S) for all t ∈ V.
















> 2λ(V) · qi/q(S) − λ(U) · qi/q(S) = 0.
But also f(q(S)) = 0 and thus, by NULL, µi(q, f) = 0 which gives the desired contradiction.
The above theorems makes clear that additivity is strong as a characterizing property since the combi-
nation with other reasonably weak properties leaves no other choice than the mechanisms induced by some
rationing family. Nevertheless, below we will show that despite the fact that this class of mechanisms might
be perceived as small, the induced range of proﬁts shares is as large as the bounds of the pessimistic core
prescribe. The following result depends on two lemmata that are put in the Appendix.
Theorem 4.7 For any R = (q, f) ∈ RS it holds
C




Most of the properties discussed earlier describe relations between shares of different instances of proﬁt
sharing problems. For example, ADD links proﬁts sharing problems with different proﬁts functions and
10ET connects outcomes on the basis of input proﬁles. This section focusses on the remaining element of the
proﬁts sharing problem, that is the set of agents. In the economic theory there has been enormous inter-
est in consistency of ideas, that allows us to use similar principles with varying populations of interacting
agents. The basic idea is that a fair solution should still be perceived so when viewed by any subgroup of
agents. Young (1985, p19) states that a solution should be stable such that ’no subgroup should want to
”re-contract”’. This kind of stability that is usually referred to as consistency is studied in various ﬁelds
of economics. Moreover in the more recent literature Friedman (1997) considers consistency properties
in heterogeneous cost sharing problems. Davis and Maschler (1965) and Hart and Mas-Colell (1989) in-
troduce the property to the ﬁeld of cooperative games, whereas Sudh¨ olter uses these ideas for solutions
on cooperative cost sharing games. Other examples are Young (1985b) on taxation problems and Moulin
(1987) on a model of surplus sharing. 6
For rationing problems ideas of consistency are intuitive. A rationing method r is called consistent if it
holds for all rationing problems (q,x) and j ∈ S that
rS\{j}(q,x) = r(qS\{j},x − rj(q,x)).
Hence, consistency states that upon removing an agent from the cooperative S, and taking all the resources
that are allocated to this agent, renewed allocation of the remaining pieces within the reduced society does
not make a difference as long as r is used. As Moulin (2002) puts it
‘changing the status of an agent from ”active participant” to ”passive expense of resources” does not alter
the overall distribution; removing one agent and his share of resources is of no consequence to other agents.
Thus Consistency is a decomposition property with respect to changes in the set of relevant agents.’
A family of rationing methods is called consistent if each of its members is. Moulin (2002) asks for a
concept of consistency according to which there is a one-to-one relationship to consistent mechanisms and
an (partial) answer is given below.
Suppose that the group of agents N face a proﬁts sharing problem (q, f) ∈ RN and that the mechanism
µ is used to calculate the individual shares. One of the agents in N, say i, leaves the problem by taking
his share µi(q, f). Suppose that now the remaining collective of agents N \ {i} may renegotiate about the
problem of sharing the leftovers. Basically there are two options, one is to stick to the old solution and the
other is to recalculate the shares according to µ. Then µ is called consistent if it leaves the vector of shares
unchanged. This means that agents should not worry about renegotiating since basically nothing will help
them to improve upon the status quo. But the crucial point here is that in order to be able to apply a solution
like µ again, ﬁrst there has to be a clear understanding what is actually the new proﬁts sharing problem.
This amounts to a translation of the original problem into a reduced problem (¯ q, ¯ f) ∈ RN\{i} where the
pre-paid amount µi(q, f) is taken into account. Although it seems fairly reasonable to use ¯ q = qN\{i} as
the new proﬁle of inputs, it is harder to get consensus about the new proﬁts function. This is illustrated in
the cost sharing literature where several reductions are proposed. Examples of studies of consistent solution
concepts for cost sharing problems are Moulin and Shenker (1994), Kolpin (1994), and Sudh¨ olter (1998).
These studies learn that the above approach toward consistency is too stringent as the type of reduction
almost seems to deﬁne the consistent mechanism. Although the models of proﬁt sharing and rationing are
closely related via the above characterization results, there seems to be more than only a technical problem
6Thompson (1996) gives a general overview on the use of consistency in the economic theory, and cost sharing problems in
particular.
11of specifying what consistency means in either models. Whereas there is a natural and very intuitive mean-
ing in the rationing model, a clear understanding for the proﬁt sharing model is absent.
In this paper I will suggest a way out of this problem as follows. As it is not clear which reduction
ﬁts the practical situation best, the proposal is to include all problems that could possibly serve as a proper
description of a reduction. Then in general a solution will be called consistent if any sharing vector in
the original solution is still available for the remaining agents in the proﬁts sharing problem with respect to
some reduction. Crucial again is what should count as an admissible reduction. I will highlight the approach
in this paper by an example.
Example
Consider a production facility jointly owned by three agents N = {1,2,3}. The agents characteristic is
the amount of labor in hours they offer as input and assume that the production technology is described by
the function p(y) = y2; that is, if aggregate labor input is y hours then the total of output generated is y2.
Suppose that the inputs of the agents is given by the proﬁle q = (1,2,3) and that µAV is used as mechanism
to share the output. Then the resulting share vector is µAV(q, p) = (6,12,18). Suppose that only one agent
can be at work at a time so that they work in shifts. If in the following an interval [v,w] indicates a shift
from time v to w then consider the following schedule, si denotes the time that agent i is active:
s1 = [0, 1
2) ∪ [51
2,6],s2 = [2,4),s3 = [1
2,2) ∪ [4,51
2).
This means that ﬁrst agent 1 works for 30 minutes, then agent 3 for 90 minutes, etcetera. Check that
according to this scheme the average proﬁts reﬂect exactly the marginal productivity of the agents. Now
suppose it is agent 2 that leaves the problem. One possible reduction is the one where the full information
about marginal production at hours where the remaining agents 1 and 3 were active is kept intact. In other
words, if the time that agent 2 worked are ”cut out” then a possible reduced problem is (qN\{2},h∗) where
h∗ ∈ F is given by
h∗(y) =

h(y) if y ≤ 2,
h(y + 2) − p(4) if y > 2.





2) if 0 ≤ y ≤ 5,
h(y + 1) − h(6) + h(51
2) − h(1
2) if y > 5.
The above schemes are not at all unique in the sense that other schedules exist that correspond to the









Then if we want to cancel out the levels at which the leaving agent was at work then this scheme would
result in a different reduction than (q∗,h∗) namely the reduction by agent 2 could as well be deﬁned by
12(qN\{2}, ¯ h) with
¯ h(y) =

h(y + 1) − 1 if 0 ≤ y ≤ 4,
h(y + 2) − 12 if y > 4,
As in the above example a plausible reduction will address different levels of input to the leaving agent,
such that both the aggregate of these levels equals the input characteristic and the corresponding marginal
proﬁts the share of the agent. /
For any bounded set U ∈ B ([0,∞)) and y ∈ R+ deﬁne Uy ⊂ [0,∞) as the smallest interval containing








f0 (t) IR+\U (t)dt, for all y ∈ R+.
So fU ∈ F takes for each input level y the total of marginal returns of the ﬁrst y levels outside U. For any
R = (q, f) ∈ RS and i ∈ S deﬁne Q(Ψ,R,i) as the set of all T ∈ B ([0,q(S)]) such that
(i) λ(T) = qi,
(ii)
R
T f0 (s)ds ∈ Ψi (q, f).
Then T ∈ Q(Ψ,R,i) can be interpreted as a set of input levels that simultaneously represent agent i’s
individual input (condition (i)) and his share of proﬁts (condition (ii)).
A solution Ψ is consistent if each restriction of a share vector in the original solution is available for some
reduced proﬁts sharing problem. Then if this holds for all reductions, Ψ is called strongly consistent.
Formally:
Consistency (CO)
For all R = (q, f) ∈ RS,i ∈ S, and y ∈ Ψ(R) there exists U ∈ Q(Ψ,R,i) such that yS\{i} ∈
Ψ(qS\{i}, fU).
Strong Consistency (SCO)
For all R = (q, f) ∈ RS,i ∈ S,y ∈ Ψ(R), it holds Q(Ψ,R,i) 6= ∅, and U ∈ Q(Ψ,R,i) =⇒ yS\{i} ∈
Ψ(qS\{i}, fU).
Below we focus on a version of consistency that is weaker than SCO but stronger than CO. It requires
consistency in general and consistency with respect to any reduction by intervals:
Interval Consistency (ICO)
Ψ ∈ S(CO) and for all R = (q, f) ∈ RS,i ∈ S,y ∈ Ψ(R) it holds that I = [t,t + qi] ∈ Q(Ψ,R,i)
implie that yS\{i} ∈ Ψ(qS\{i}, fI). Note that S(SCO) ⊂ S(ICO) ⊂ S(CO).
So the above notions of consistency require that any eligible share vector in the solution should be feasible
by a proper choice of the reduction. Consistency requires at least one suitable reduction whereas strong
consistency requires invariance of the solution with respect to any reduction that ﬁts. Analogously, the
notion of (strong) interval consistency restrict the attention to speciﬁc reductions, i.e., those induced by
13intervals.
The gap between these notions of consistency and others found in the cost sharing literature is eminent.
The approaches towards consistency as in Moulin and Shenker (1994), Kolpin (1994), and Sudh¨ olter (1998)
andKolpin(1994)areallalikeinthesensethatthereductionconsistsofthereduceddemandproﬁletogether
with a truncated cost function. For instance, consider consistency as in Moulin and Shenker (1994), where
for (q,c) ∈ RS
− and i ∈ S and cost sharing mechanisms Ψ the reduced cost function is determined by




would only be a reduction in the above sense
if Ψi (q,c) = c(qi). The problem with the approach in Sudh¨ olter (1998) is that the Davis-Maschler and
Hart-Mas-Collell reduced games do not correspond to reduced proﬁts sharing problems anymore since the
condition f(0) = 0 is in general not satisﬁed. However, the new proposal requires a more subtle approach
in that the size of the truncation should counterbalance the share of the agent that goes away. The next
example shows that the proposed consistency is rather weak and it leaves space for most of the discussed
solution concepts.
Example 5.1 The marginal mechanisms µσ are consistent but not strongly consistent. Consider R =










is a reduced proﬁts sharing problem with respect to i. Moreover, according to µσ the same
ordering of the remaining agents is used to calculate the individual shares in the reduced proﬁts sharing
problem. Then the immediate consequence is that nothing changes for the agents k with σ(k) < σ(i).
Now consider an agent k with σ(k) > σ(i). Then using the notation qt














































This means that µσ is consistent (also in the sense of Moulin and Shenker (1994)). Nevertheless, µσ is not
stronglyconsistent.Toseethisconsidertheproblem R = (q, f) ∈ R{1,2,3} with f (y) =
R
[0,y] I[0,1]∪[2,3] (t)dt
and q = (1,1,1). Suppose that σ(i) = i for all i ∈ {1,2,3}. Then µσ (q, f) = (1,0,1). Then





= 1 6= µσ
2 (q, f). In a similar way one may prove that the
pessimistic marginal sharing mechanisms µσ
p are consistent but not strongly so. /
Theorem 5.2 If µ = µπ is consistent, then π is a consistent rationing family.
7Moulin and Shenker (1994) also discuss a restricted type of consistency, namely consistency restricted to only the smallest agents.
It is used as a characterizing property for the serial cost sharing mechanism (Moulin and Shenker (1992)). Kolpin (1994) generalizes
this idea through baseline consistency to the heterogeneous goods cost sharing model.






Moreover, for each j ∈ S we have for R = (q,Γx), [x − µj(q,Γx),x] = [x − rj(q,x),x] ∈ Q(µ,R, j).
But then it holds by CO for all x ∈ [0,q(S)] that
rS\{j}(q,x) = µS\{j}(q,Γx) = µ(qS\{j},Γx−rj(q,x)) = r(qS\{j},x − rj(q,x)).
The theory of distributive justice is often concerned with stable allocation schemes that are robust
against small changes in the parameters that deﬁne the allocation problem at hand. In the rationing the-
ory this stability is formulated through continuity. A rationing method r is called continuous if it is jointly
continuous in both arguments, i.e., (q,t) 7→ r(q,t) is continuous for all rationing problems (q,t).
Similarly, a mechanism will be called continuous if small changes in both the proﬁt function and agent
characteristics do not cause huge relative differences in the corresponding shares. More speciﬁcally:
CONT Mechanism µ is continuous if for each S ⊆ N the mapping RS
+ ×R+ deﬁned by (q,t) 7→ µ(q,Γt)
is continuous.
Remark Notice that the notion can be considered weak for the reason that continuity encompasses small
changes in base functions Γt only. In order to avoid the hybrid character of CONT one may consider the
replacement by the following properties that sees to a clear-cut distinction between continuity aspects of
proﬁts and agent characteristics:
Proﬁt-continuity For each S ⊆ N and q ∈ RS
+ the mapping R+ → RS
+ deﬁned by t 7→ µ(q,Γt) is contin-
uous.
Input-continuity For each S ⊆ N the mapping RS
+ → RS
+ deﬁned by q 7→ µ(q,Γt) is continuous on
{q

 q(S) ≤ t}.
Then a mechanism that is both proﬁt- as well as input-continuous is continuous. /
Young (1987) deﬁnes the rich class of parametric rationing methods that contains numerous classic ra-
tioning methods like the proportional method and the uniform gains and uniform losses method.
Let f : D → R be a real-valued function where D ⊂ R2 is a set in R+ ×[0,Λ] for some Λ ∈ R+ ∪{∞}.
It is assumed that for any (z,λ) ∈ D it holds that f(z,0) = 0, f(z,Λ) = z and λ 7→ f(z,λ) is non-
decreasing and continuous. Then for such an f there is a unique rationing method r such that
ri(x,t) = f(xi,λ) where λ is a solution of ∑
i∈S
f(xi,λ) = t.
This r is then called the parametric rationing method for f. It is easily seen that such a method is
consistent.8 Young (1987) characterizes the parametric methods as the methods that satisfy equal treatment,
consistency and continuity, a result that is useful in the present framework of mechanisms as well.
8The class of parametric rationing methods is rich and contains for example the proportional rationing method, uniform gains and
uniform losses methods. See for further references Moulin (2002).
15Lemma 5.3 If µ ∈ M(CR,ADD,POS) is continuous then µ = µπ and π is a family of continuous
rationing methods.
Proof. Consider µ = µπ ∈ M. Then without loss of generality it may be assumed that π consists of the
rationing methods deﬁned by
r(q,t) := µ(q,Γt).
Then clearly continuity of µ implies continuity of the method r.
Moreover, he proves the result that this class consists precisely of the methods that satisfy equal treat-
ment of equals, continuity and consistency. This will be of use to characterize mechanisms. First I will
introduce parametric rationing methods formally.
Theorem 5.4 Any µ ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR,CO,ET,CONT) is represented by a parametric rationing
family.
Proof. By Proposition 4.4 it follows that the rationing family satisﬁes equal treatment. Then by Theorem 1
in Young (1987) and Lemma 5.3 the result obtains.
Proving results the other way around is more complex. Till this very moment I am not sure whether
each consistent rationing method induces a consistent proﬁt sharing mechanism. Nevertheless, below I
will prove that consistency is transferred smoothly between the models of rationing and proﬁt sharing as far
as the incremental mechanisms and piecewise linear rationing methods are concerned.
All of the earlier examples of additive mechanisms have in common that a ﬁnite number of intermedi-
ate levels of input determines the ﬁnal solution, as the proﬁts increments of two consecutive levels is split
amongst the agents in a ﬁxed ratio. Recall the random order values in this respect, by which shares are
determined on basis of the intermediate input levels of coalitional aggregate inputs. Here I will discuss
a more general class of mechanisms, each of one splits increments related to other intermediate levels of
input as well.
A mechanism µ is called an incremental mechanism if for each q ∈ RS
+ there is an integer k ∈ N,






α` (f(x`) − f(x`−1)) for all f ∈ F, (10)




α` (x` − x`−1) = q.




 q ∈ RS
+
	
is determined by the piecewise linear mappings t 7→ r(q,t) such that
∂
∂t
r(q,t) = α` for all t ∈ (x`−1,x`) (11)
16in case x` 6= x`−1. The set of all incremental mechanisms is denoted MI. Notice that MI ⊂ M+. Then
MI forms a generalization of the class of incremental methods and random order mechanisms as in Weber
(1988).
Examples
• The average mechanism is an incremental mechanism with
k = 1,xk = q(S),αk =
q
q(S)
whenever q(S) > 0.
• For q ∈ RS
+ there is a permutation σ ∈ Π(S) that such that qσ(i) ≤ qσ(j) ⇔ σ(i) ≤ σ(j) for all
i, j ∈ S. Then take k = |S| and
x` = ∑
p≤σ−1(`)−1




1/(|S| − ` + 1) if σ(i) ≥ `,
0 else.
The corresponding incremental mechanism is the serial mechanism.
• Each marginal mechanism µσ is incremental with x`,α` such that
x` = ∑
p≤σ−1(`)
qσ(p) and α`i = 1 ⇐⇒ σ(i) = `.






















• An example of a mechanisms that is not incremental is µσ
p.
The next result is that there is a one–to–one correspondence between the consistent incremental mech-
anisms and the consistent piecewise linear rationing methods.
Theorem 5.5 µ ∈ MI(POS,ADD,CR) is consistent if and only if µ = µπ and π is a consistent family
of piecewise linear rationing methods.
One may easily verify that the rationing methods corresponding to the earlier mentioned incremental
mechanisms are all consistent. Then an implication of Theorem 5.5 is that:
Corollary 5.6 The mechanisms µAV,µSR,µσ,Φ are all consistent.
Moulin (2000) introduces the notion of a reducible rationing method. Basically, a rationing method is
reducible if there is an ordered partition of the set of agents and for each element in the partition a (differ-
ent) rationing method such that the ﬁnal allocation can be determined in two steps: (1) for each element in
17the induced ordered partitioning of a coalition S it is prescribed what units are available for this group of
agents, (2) these units are shared among the corresponding agents according to the rationing method asso-
ciated with this element in the partition. This two step procedure will be used for the proﬁt sharing model
as well. A mechanism will be called reducible if there is a non-trivial ordered partition N of N, such that
proﬁt shares may be calculated by different mechanisms to certain proﬁt sharing problems induced by the
ordered partition. Formally this procedure is as follows.
Consider an ordered partition N = (N(1), N(2),..., N(κ)) of N, where κ is an integer smaller than
|N|. Given N,R = (q, f) ∈ RS deﬁne for k = 1,...,κ the proﬁt function f k














for all y ∈ R+.
A mechanism µ ∈ M is reducible if there is a non-trivial ordered partition N = (N(1), N(2),..., N(κ))
of N together with mechanisms µ1,...,µκ ∈ M such that for each (q, f) ∈ RS,i ∈ S ∩ N(k) it holds
µi(q, f) = µk
i(qS∩N(k), f k
R).
Then µ is also called the composition of the mechanisms µ1,...,µκ. So, as an analogue to the rationing
model, here the ordered partition is used to address the different proﬁt levels to the elements in the induced
partition. The corresponding proﬁt sharing problem consists of the relevant agent characteristics together
with a proﬁt function that carries all the information of the original problem of the relevant proﬁt levels.
Theorem 5.7 µ ∈ MI(POS,ADD,CR) is interval consistent if and only if it is a composition of the
average mechanism and marginal mechanisms.
Corollary 5.8 There is exactly one strongly consistent mechanism in MI(POS,ADD,CR) and that is
µAV.
Proof. First we will show that actually µAV is strongly consistent. Consider a reduction of the problem























In order to show the uniqueness it is enough to point out that any reducible mechanism is not strongly
consistent. Then Theorem 5.7 shows that only µAV remains. This looks like exploiting the ideas of Example
5.1.
18Remark In fact one may prove that the unique strongly consistent mechanism in M(POS,ADD,CR) is
µAV. A proof is available upon request.
Corollary 5.9 Suppose Y ∈ {ET,LM,PM}. The unique interval consistent incremental mechanism in
M(POS,ADD,CR,Y) is µAV.
These are applications from the properties of the rationing methods.
Note that the above proofs are also sound within the class of cost sharing problems, and may serve to iden-
tify the different cost sharing mechanisms.
Below there is a ﬁrst characterization of the pessimistic core. It is the maximal consistent solution in the
pessimistic imputation set.
Theorem 5.10 If Ψ ∈ S(CO) and Ψ(R) ⊆ IP(R) for all R ∈ R, then Ψ(R) ⊆ CP(R) for all R ∈ R.
The below result shows that in a way the consistent incremental mechanisms are dense in the set of all
mechanisms represented by a family of rationing methods.
Lemma 5.11 Suppose that for a speciﬁc ¯ q ∈ RU
+,U ⊆ N there is a rationing method ¯ r such that t 7→
¯ r(¯ q,t) is monotonic and piecewise linear. Then there is a rationing family π = {r(q,·)
  q ∈ RS
+,S ⊆
N} such that (i) r(¯ q,·) = ¯ r(¯ q,·) and (ii) µπ ∈ MI(POS,ADD,CR,CO).
Proof. There are numbers 0 = ¯ x0 < ¯ x1 < ... < ¯ xk−1 < ¯ xk = ¯ q(S) and ¯ α1,..., ¯ αk ∈ ∆(U) such that
∂
∂t
¯ r(¯ q,t) = ¯ α` for all t ∈ (¯ x`−1, ¯ x`).
Thedeﬁnitionofr iscompletedasfollows. Take S ⊆ N and q ∈ RS
+. DeﬁneU∗ = {j ∈ U∩S
  qj = ¯ qj}.
Determine x1,x2,...,x|U∗| by putting x0 = 0 and for ` = 1,2,...,k
x` = x`−1 + (1− ¯ α`(U \ U∗))(˜ x` − ˜ x`−1).
Write S \ U∗ = {i1,i2,...,i|S\U∗|} such that ip < ip+1 for all p = 1,2,...,|S \ U∗|. Moreover deﬁne







if j ∈ U∗,
0 if j ∈ S \ U∗,
Moreover αk+1,αk+1,...,αk+|S\U∗| are vectors in ∆(S) such that αk+` has all zeroes except for coordinate
corresponding to agent i`, which takes value 1. Then, ﬁnally, deﬁne the monotonic and piecewise linear
rationing method r(q,·) by
∂
∂t
r(q,t) = α` for ` = 1,2,...,k + |S \ U∗|.
19In this way we obtain a family of rationing methods π = {r(q,·)
  q ∈ RS
+,S ⊆ N} that speciﬁes a
consistent incremental mechanism µπ.
Theorem 5.12 For each µ ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR) and q ∈ RS
+ there is a sequence {µk}k=1,2,... of
mechanisms in MI(CO) such that µ(q, f) = limk→∞ µk(q, f) for all f ∈ F.
Proof. Let µ ¯ π ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR), with ¯ π = {¯ r(q,·)
  q ∈ RS
+,S ⊆ N} the corresponding rationing
family. Take ¯ q ∈ RS
+. The mapping t 7→ ¯ r(¯ q,t) is continuous. For each n ∈ N and k = 1,2,...,2n deﬁne
a number tn
k = k2−n ¯ q(S). Deﬁne the piecewise linear rationing method ¯ rn(¯ q,·) by putting
∂
∂t
¯ rn(¯ q,t) =
¯ r(¯ q,tn












for each k = 1,2,...,2n and with tn
0 = 0. Use Lemma 5.11 to construct a rationing family π(n) =
{rn(q,·)

 q ∈ RS
+,S ⊆ N} such that rn(¯ q,·) = ¯ rn(¯ q,·) and µn := µπ(n) is consistent. Then since
rn(q,·) → r(q,·) uniformly we have µn(q, f) → µ(q, f) for n → ∞, for each f ∈ F.
6 From solutions to mechanisms by super-additivity
Below we will start with set solutions and state a corresponding generalized additivity property. It states
that a contingent planner should proﬁt from combining return sharing problems in the sense that the set of
available options does not shrink by doing so. Compare this with additivity, that requires invariance with
respect to such an operation. But ﬁrst we need some extra notation. Given S ⊆ N,X,Y ⊂ RS we deﬁne
the direct sum of X and Y as the set X ⊕ Y := {z





 x ∈ X
	
.
Super-additivity A solution Ψ is super-additive (SADD) if it holds that
Ψ(q, f1) ⊕ Ψ(q, f2) ⊆ Ψ(q, f1 + f2),
for all f1, f2 ∈ F,q ∈ RS
+,S ⊆ N.
Super-additivity states that combining several sharing problems into one does not limit the eligible set of
shares as a solution. Of course, the class S(SADD) contains the set of all additive mechanisms M(ADD).
Zero property A solution Ψ satisﬁes Z if Ψ(q, fz) = {0} for all q ∈ RS
+,S ⊆ N.
Proposition 6.1 S(NE,SADD,Z) = M(ADD).
Proof. First we will show that M(ADD) ⊆ S(NE,SADD,Z). Take µ ∈ M(ADD). Then for all q
µ(q, fz) = µ(q, fz) + µ(fz) = 2µ(fz),
hence µ(q, fz) = 0. Take Ψ ∈ S(NE,SADD,Z). By SADD and Z we have for each (d, f) ∈ R
Ψ(q, f) ⊕ Ψ(q,−f) ⊆ Ψ(q, f + (−f)) = Ψ(q, fz) = {0}.
20By NE both Ψ(q, f) and Ψ(q,−f) have at least one element. Hence it can not be the case that one of these
sets has more than one element since that would mean that Ψ(q, f) ⊕ Ψ(q,−f) contains more than one
element. Then Ψ(q, f) = {x},Ψ(q,−f) = {y} implies x + y = 0 and Ψ(q, f) = −Ψ(q,−f).
Boundedness A solution Ψ satisﬁes B if for all for all f ∈ F it holds that Ψ(q, f) is bounded in RS
for all investment proﬁles q ∈ RS
+. To be precise, for each (q, f) ∈ RS there exists a γ > 0 such that
kΨ(q, f)k < γ.
When a solution is unbounded, then there is at least one agent that is extremely exploited by another.
Hence B is regarded a weak property, stating that ﬁnite differences in investment do not lead to arbitrary
large differences in the shares of proﬁt. It can be interpreted as a very weak incentive property for investing.
Voluntary cooperation is more likely to occur if there are upper bounds on cost shares as well as lower
bounds on return shares.
The properties NE, SADD, and Z are logically independent: C satisﬁes SADD and Z but not NE, CP
satisﬁes NE, Z, but not SADD, whereas A satisﬁes both NE and SADD but not Z.
Proposition 6.2 S(NE,SADD,B) = M(ADD).
Proof. It is sufﬁcient to show that S(NE,SADD,B) ⊆ S(NE,SADD,Z). Suppose there exists
Ψ ∈ S(NE,SADD,B) \ S(NE,SADD,Z).
Then there is q ∈ RS
+ and x ∈ RS \ {0} such that x ∈ Ψ(q, fz). Then by induction and SADD it follows
that {2kx}k∈N, contradicting B.
Logical independence
• C satisﬁes SADD and B. It fails to be non-empty for some returns sharing problems. To see this,
just consider any non-zero investment proﬁle and a concave returns function. Then even the set of
imputations is empty.
• CPsatisﬁes B and NE, but does not satisfy SADD. Since for q = (1,2) and f1(y) = min{y,1} en
f2(y) = max{y − 1,0} we have
CP(q, f1) = {x ∈ R2 
 x1 ≤ 1,x2 ≤ 1,x1 + x2 = 1}
CP(q, f2) = {x ∈ R2 
 x1 ≤ 1,x2 ≤ 2,x1 + x2 = 2}
In particular (1,0) ∈ CP(q, f1) and (1,1) ∈ CP(q, f2). Then CP cannot be sub-additive since
CP(q, f1 + f2) = {q} and (1,0) + (1,1) 6= q.
• The set of all share vectors A(d, f) =

x ∈ RS 
 x(S) = f(d(S))
	
for (d, f) ∈ RS deﬁnes a
solution that satisﬁes the properties SADD and NE, except B.
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A Appendix
Lemma A.1 Let R = (q, f) ∈ RS and take y ∈ CP(R). Then for each i ∈ S there is a ∈ [0,q(S \ {i})]
such that yi = f P
R (a + qi) − f P
R (a).
Proof. Let i ∈ S and deﬁne g : [0,∞) → R by g(t) = f P
R (t + qi) − f P
R (t). Then g(0) = f P
R (qi) ≤ yi
and g(q(S\{i})) = f P
R (q(S)) − f P
R (q(S\{i})) ≥ yi. The latter inequality follows from the fact that
y ∈ CP (q, f) since f P
R (q(S)) = y(S) and f P
R (q(S\{i})) ≤ y(S\{i}). Recall that f P
R is convex and
thus continuous. Then by continuity of g there exists a such that g(a) = yi.




Tx f0(t)dt and λ(Tx) = x. The sets can be taken such that x ≤ y =⇒ Tx ⊆ Ty.
Proof. Take x ∈ [0,q(S)]. For z ∈ R+ we deﬁne Dz :=

t ∈ [0,q(S)]
  f0(t) ≥ z
	





 λ(Dz) ≥ x
	
. We distinguish two cases, λ(Dz) = x and λ(Dz(x)) > x. We will show
that the choice of Tx := Dz(x) serves our goal. To see this, just take an arbitrary T ∈ B([0,q(S)]) with
λ(T) = x,T 6= Tx. Then in particular for t ∈ T \ Tx it holds that f0(t) < z(x) and therefore
Z
T\Tx

































Tx f0(t)dt. Nowforthesecondcaseassumethat λ(Dz(x)) >
x. This means that
λ({t ∈ [0,q(S)]

 f0(t) = z(x)}) > λ(Dz(x)) − x.




  f0(t) = z(x)
	
) = λ(Dz(x)) − x.
Now take Tx := Dz(x) \ ([0,t0] ∩ {t ∈ [0,q(S)]
  f0(t) = z(x)}). Then λ(Tx) = x and the rest is proved
analogously to the ﬁrst case. Besides, it should be clear from the presented construction that Tx ⊆ Ty
whenever x ≤ y.
Lemma A.3
Let f : [0,y] → R be increasing and convex such that f(0) = 0. Then for any α ∈ [0,1] there is an
interval I = [t,t + αy] ⊆ [0,y] such that
αf(y) = f(t + αy) − f(t). (14)
Proof. Deﬁne g : [0,(1− α)y] → R+ by g(t) = f(t + αy) − f(t). Convexity of f implies
g(0) = f(αy) ≤ αf(y) = f(y) − (1− αy)f(y) ≤ f(y) − f((1− α)y) = g((1− α)y).
Hence by continuity of g there is t ∈ [0,(1− α)y] such that g(t) = αf(y).
Lemma A.4 For any µ ∈ S(ADD,POS,CR),Q(µ,R,i) 6= ∅ for all R ∈ R.
Proof. Take R = (q, f) ∈ RS,i ∈ S. By Theorem 4.7 and Lemma A.1 there is an interval T = [a,a + qi]
such that
R
T f0(t)dt = f P
R(a + qi) − f P
R(a). Moreover we may choose sets U,V ∈ B([0,q(S)]),U ⊆ V
such that
R
U f0(t)dt = f P
R(a) and
R
V f0(t)dt = f P
R(a + qi). Then V \ U ∈ Q(µ,R,i).
Proof of Proposition 4.2
Let µ ∈ M+(ADD). If there is an extension of µ to R then it must be ¯ µ ∈ M deﬁned by ¯ µ(q, f) =
µ(q, f+) − µ(q, f−) for all (q, f) ∈ R. We will show that ¯ µ ∈ M(ADD). Take any f1, f2 ∈ F+. Then
we have f+
1 + f+
2 − (f1 + f2)+ ∈ F+ and (f1 + f2)− − f−
1 − f−
2 ∈ F+ and























































































µ(q, f1 + f2 − (f1 + f2)) = 0.
This proves ADD.
24Proof of Theorem 4.3
Take µ ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR). Then in particular µ ∈ M+(POS,ADD,CR). By Theorem 4.1 there is
a rationing family π for µ. Then by Proposition 4.2 there is a unique extension ¯ µ of µ to M(ADD) and























Moreover µ = ¯ µ and we are there. The other way around is easy.
Proof of Theorem 4.7.
The proof of the inclusion ”⊇” is easy and essentially done in Tijs and Koster (1998). We will now prove
”⊆”. Basically the argument is to choose a partition of the interval [0,q(S)] such that each member in this
partition is associated with a particular agent such that the corresponding marginal proﬁts equal the share
according to y ∈ CP (q, f). Then this partition is used to deﬁne a rationing method r(q,·). Then any set
of rationing methods for other input proﬁles completes the deﬁnition of the necessary rationing family π.
At this point we may assume without loss of generality that S = N and that we made a choice for the
rationing methods r(q0,·) for all q0 6= q. Then our objective is to ﬁnd r(q,·) such that µπ (R) = y. Let
T1 = [a1,a1 + q1] be an interval as in Lemma A.1 for agent 1 and let f1 = f P
R. Deﬁne a new proﬁts sharing
problem R2 = (q2, f2) by q2 := qN\{1} and
f2 (y) =

f1 (y) if y ≤ a1,
f1 (a1) + f1 (y + q1) − f (a1 + q1) if y > a1.
Notice that f2 is convex and that for this reason f P
R2 = f2. Application of Lemma A.1 to R2 and agent
2 gives us a set T2 = [a2,a2 + q2] such that f2 (a2 + q2) − f2 (a2) = y2. Then we proceed as follows.









where fi+1 ∈ F is given by
fi+1 (y) =

fi (y) if 0 ≤ y ≤ ai,
fi (ai) + fi (y + qi) − fi (ai + qi) if y > ai.




such that f P
Ri+1 = fi+1. Then by application of Lemma A.1




with the property that fi+1 (ai+1 + qi+1) − fi+1 (ai+1) = yi+1. Then
deﬁne Ti+1 = [ai+1,ai+1 + qi+1]. Deﬁne for each i ∈ N a function gi : [0,∞) → R+ by
gi (y) =

y if y ≤ ai,
y + qi if y > ai.
InadditiondeﬁneU1 := T1 andfori ∈ N\{1} letUi ⊆ [0,q(N)] bedeﬁnedbyUi := (g2 ◦ g3 ◦ ... ◦ gi)(Ti).
Then these sets U1,U2,...,Un have the following properties

λ(Ui ∩ Uj) = 0 if i 6= j, and
λ(Ui) = λ(Ti) = qi for all i ∈ N.







































Proof of Theorem 5.5
Step 1: First I will show that any incremental mechanism µ ∈ M(POS,ADD,CR) deﬁned by (10) is
consistent if and only if for all S ⊆ N,q ∈ RS





˜ α` {f(˜ x`) − f(˜ x`−1)},
where ˜ x ∈ Rk+1 and ˜ α1, ˜ α2,..., ˜ αk ∈ ∆(S \ {j}) are given for each ` = 1,2,...,k by










if α`(S \ {j}) > 0,
0 else.
(16)
Let R = (q, f) ∈ RS, j ∈ S and α,x be as in (10) and ˜ α, ˜ x as in (15) and (16), respectively. We will show
that there is a set U ∈ Q(µ,R, j) such that µS\{j}(q, f) = µ(qS\{j}, fU). Deﬁne for each ` ∈ {1,2,...,k}






 T ∈ B([x`−1,x`]),λ(T) = y

. (17)
According to Lemma A.3 (in the Appendix) there is for each ` an interval I` = [t`,t` +α`j (x` − x`−1)] ⊂
[x`−1,x`] such that f`(t` + α`j (x` − x`−1)) − f`(t`) = α`j f` (x` − x`−1). As in Lemma A.2 each inter-
val I` corresponds to a set U` ∈ B([x`−1,x`]) such that
Z
U`
f0(t)dt = α`j f`((x` − x`−1) = α`j (f(x`) − f(x`−1)).
Then in particular U = ∪`U` ∈ Q(µ,R, j). By construction we have

























α`i (f(x`) − f(x`−1)) = µi(q, f).
Notice that the fourth equality is due to the fact that α`j implies α`i = 0.
Now the second part of the statement. Suppose that µ ∈ MI(POS,ADD,CR,CO) and that for q ∈ RS
+
there are x ∈ Rk+1 and ˜ α1, ˜ α2,..., ˜ αk ∈ ∆(S) as in (10) and (11). We will show that the fact that µ is
consistent implies the equalities (15) and (16). Lemma 5.11 below shows that the vectors x ∈ Rk+1
+ and
α1,α2,...,αk canbeusedtogetherwith(15)and(16)todeﬁneamechanism µπ ∈ MI(POS,ADD,CR,CO)
such that µ(q, f) = µπ(q, f) for all f ∈ F. We will show that µ(qS\{j}, f) = µπ(qS\{j}, f) for all
f ∈ F. For t ∈ R+ we deﬁne Rt = (q,Λt) where Λt : R+ → R+ is the slant function deﬁned by
Λt(y) = max{y − t,0} for all y ∈ R+. We will show that µ(qS\{j},Λt) = µπ(qS\{j},Λt) for all t ≥ 0.
Obviously this holds whenever t > q(S \ {j}) as Λt(y) = 0 for all y ∈ [0,q(S \ {j})]. Consider the map
h : [0,q(S \ {j})] → R+ deﬁned by h(t) = t − µj(q,Λt). Then h is non-decreasing and continuous and,
moreover, h([0,q(S)]) = [0,qS\{j}]. This means that for each t ∈ [0,q(S \ {j})] and t∗ ∈ h−1(t) that for
each U ∈ Q(µ,Rt, j) and V ∈ Q(µπ,Rt, j) where Rt = (q,Λt) it holds


























Moulin and Shenker (1994) show that two additive mechanisms coincide whenever they yield the same
share vectors for slant functions. The same reasoning can be adopted here in order to conclude that
µ(qS\{j}, f) = µπ(qS\{j}, f) for all f ∈ F. Now, ﬁnally, observe that two incremental mechanisms
only determine the same share vectors if they allow for the same formulation in terms of x and α’s as in
(10).
Step 2:
Suppose r belongs to a family π of consistent and piecewise linear rationing methods, and that for q ∈ RS
+
there are x0,x1,...,xk with 0 = x0 < ... < xk = q(S) and α1,...,αk ∈ ∆(S) such that for any





αh(xh − xh−1) + α`(t − x`−1) (18)





˜ αh(˜ xh − ˜ xh−1) + ˜ α`(t − ˜ x`−1), (19)
where ˜ x`, ˜ α` are deﬁned by the equalities (15) and (16). First notice that by piecewise linearity the mappings
t 7→ r(q,t) and y 7→ r(qS\{j},y) are both differentiable almost everywhere. Hence, by consistency, it holds





































· α`(S \ {j}).
The constant α`(S \ {j}) = 0 if and only if x`−1 − rj(q,x`−1) = x`−1 − rj(q,x`−1), hence we may
conclude that for any y ∈ (x`−1 − rj(q,x`−1),x`−1 − rj(q,x`−1)) the derivative of the mapping y 7→
r(qS\{j},y) is constant. Now deﬁne ¯ x0, ¯ x1,..., ¯ xk and ¯ α1, ¯ α2,..., ¯ αk by
¯ x` = x` − rj(q,x`)
¯ α` =

α` · α`(S \ {j})−1 if α(S \ {j}) > 0,
0 else





¯ αh(¯ xh − ¯ xh−1) + ¯ α`(t − ¯ x`−1).
Noticethattheabovedeﬁnitionsof ¯ x` and ¯ α` matchthatof ˜ x` and ˜ α` inequations(15)and(16), respectively,
since


















(1− αhj)(xh − xh−1).
28Then Step 1 together with Step 2 complete the proof of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 5.7
Suppose µ is an interval consistent incremental mechanism. Then in particular µ is consistent. Consider
q ∈ RS
++. Then there is k ∈ N and for each ` ∈ {1,2,...,k} a real number x` ∈ [0,q(S)] and vector





α` {f(x`) − f(x`−1)}, for all f ∈ F. (20)
Consider functions fn : R+ → R by fn(x) = enx − 1 for all x ≥ 0,n ∈ N and deﬁne Rn = (q, fn).
Then for each n such fn is strictly convex. In particular this means that for each j ∈ N there is precisely




n + qj] ∈ Q(µ,Rn, j) for each n ∈ N. Deﬁne f
j
n = (fn)I(n,j) for each n ∈ N.
Distinguish the following cases: (i) there is only one agent j with positive αkj, or αkj = 1, and (ii) there are
at least two agents i and j with αki,αkj > 0.
Case (i): Suppose that xk − xk−1 < qj. Then t
j
n < xk−1 for all n ∈ N and for large n it holds
µj(q, fn) ≥ αkj {fn(xk) − fn(xk−1)}
= fn(xk) − fn(xk−1)
> fn(t
j
n + qj) − fn(t
j
n).
But this means that I(n, j) 6∈ Q(µ,Rn, j) for large n, contradiction. Hence it must be that xk − xk−1 = qj.
Then α`j = 0 for all ` 6= k.




n}n∈N such that t
j
h(n) ≤ ˜ xk−1 for all
n ∈ N. Since µ is interval consistent we have for each n ∈ N that µS\{j}(q, fn) = µ(qS\{j}, f
j
n). By Step













By distinguishing the powers in this sum we must have
lim
n→∞









For all n we have
f
j
h(n)(˜ xk) − f
j
h(n)(˜ xk−1) = fh(n)(˜ xk + qj) − fh(n)(˜ xk−1) − µj(q, fh(n)).










fh(n)(xk) − fh(n)(xk−1 − qj + αkj(xk − xk−1)) − αkj(fh(n)(xk) − fh(n)(xk−1))
o
= 0.
29Since αki − ˜ αki(1− αj`) = 0, the terms with the highest argument xk vanish, so we get
lim
n→∞−αki fh(n)(xk−1) − ˜ αki
n
−fh(n)(xk−1 − qj + αkj(xk − xk−1)) + αkj fh(n)(xk−1)
o
= 0. (23)
Since αki > 0 it must hold that αkj(xk − xk−1) = qj. By interchanging the role of i and j we see that also
αki(xk − xk−1) = qi. In particular for any agent p with αkp > 0 it holds that αkp(xk − xk−1) = qp and
therefore
xk − xk−1 = ∑
j∈S;αkj>0
αkj(xk − xk−1) = ∑
j∈S;αkj>0
qj,




and α`i = 0 for all ` 6= k (24)
Proof of Theorem 5.10
Part (i): Take y ∈ CP (q, f) for (q, f) ∈ RS,S ⊆ N. Let i ∈ S,Q ⊂ S \ {i}. According to Lemma
A.1 there is an interval [a,a + qi] ⊆ [0,q(S)] such that yi = f P
R (a + qi) − f P
R (a). Consider a family of
measurable sets {Tz}z∈[0,q(S)] as in Lemma A.2. Consider T = Ta+qi \ Ta. Then it holds
R
T f0 (s)ds =
yi ∈ CP (q,c)i . Moreover λ(T) = qi, so T ∈ Q(CP,S,i). Let RT := (q, fT). By y ∈ CP (q, f) it holds
y(Q ∪ {i}) ≥ f P
R (q(Q ∪ {i})), so
y(Q) ≥ f
P































By variation of Q and the fact that y(S \ {i}) = fT (q(S \ {i})) we conclude that yS\{i} ∈ CP (RT).
Part (ii): Let Ψ be a consistent solution. Then we need to show that Ψ(R) ⊆ CP (R) for all problems
R = (q, f) ∈ R. We will start with a proof for R ∈ RN and a similar reasoning applies for arbitrary
R ∈ RS. So assume Ψ ∈ S(CO),R ∈ RN, and x ∈ Ψ(R) ⊆ IP(R). Then it sufﬁces to prove that
for any S ⊆ N, x(S) ≤ f P
R(q(S)). By consistency it holds that there is a T1 ∈ Q(Ψ,R,{1}) such








such that xN\{1,2} ∈ Ψ(qN\{1,2},(fT1)T2).Put R2 = (qN\{1,2},(fT1)T2). This procedure may now be re-
peated for the agents 3,4,...,n. In this way we obtain proﬁt sharing problems R0,R1,...,Rn−1, and Rn,
such that R0 = R, and for i ∈ N,Ri = (qN\{1,2,...,i}, fi) ∈ RN\{1,2,...,i} is such that fi = fi−1
Ti−1 for
30some Ti−1 ∈ Q(Ψ,Ri−1,{i}) with the property that xN\{1,2,...,i} ∈ Ψ(Ri). In particular by deﬁnition of a








Deﬁne increasing bijections gi : [0,q(N\{1,2,...,i − 1}] → [0,q(N\{1,2,...,i − 1}) − λ(Ti)] by
gi(s) = λ([0,s]\Ti) for all s ∈ [0,q(N\{1,2,...,i − 1})].
Note that





2 ◦ ... ◦ g−1








satisﬁes the following three properties:
a) λ(T∗
i ∩ T∗
j ) = 0 for all i 6=, j, since g`’s are bijections,
b) λ(T∗

















 T ∈ B([0,q(N)]);λ(T) = q(S)

= f P
R(q(S)).
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